

Tritax Symmetry (Hinckley) Limited

HINCKLEY NATIONAL RAIL FREIGHT INTERCHANGE

Preliminary Environmental Information Report

Chapter 19: Accidents and disasters

January 2022

This document forms a part of a Preliminary Environmental Information Report (PEIR) for the Hinckley National Rail Freight Interchange project.

A PEIR presents environmental information to assist consultees to form an informed view of the likely significant environmental effects of a proposed development and provide feedback.

This PEIR has been prepared by the project promoter, Tritax Symmetry (Hinckley) Limited. The Proposed Development is described in Chapter 3 of the PEIR and is the subject of a public consultation running from 12 January to 9 March 2022.

Details of how to respond to the public consultation are provided at the end of Chapter 1 of the PEIR and on the project website:

<http://www.hinckleynrfi.co.uk/>

This feedback will be taken into account by Tritax Symmetry (Hinckley) Limited in the preparation of its application for a Development Consent Order for the project.

Chapter 19 ◆ Major accidents and disasters

INTRODUCTION

- 19.1. This chapter sets out the approach that TSH has adopted to assess the likely effects of the Proposed Development in relation to the risk from major accidents and disasters.
- 19.2. The EIA Regulations 2017 (Schedule 4, Paragraph 8) require the consideration of:

'A description of the expected significant adverse effects of the development on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the development to risks of major accidents and/or disasters which are relevant to the project concerned. Relevant information available and obtained through thorough risk assessments pursuant to EU legislation ... or UK environmental assessments may be used for this purpose provided that the requirements of this Directive are met. Where appropriate, this description should include measures envisaged to prevent or mitigate the significant adverse effects of such events on the environment and details of the preparedness for and proposed response to such emergencies'.

EIA SCOPING OPINION

- 19.3. Paragraph 3.3.17 of the Secretary of State's 2020 EIA Scoping Opinion for the HNRFI Project advised that:

'The ES should include a description and assessment (where relevant) of the likely significant effects resulting from accidents and disasters applicable to the Proposed Development. The Applicant should make use of appropriate guidance (e.g. that referenced in the Health and Safety Executives (HSE) Annex to Advice Note 11) to better understand the likelihood of an occurrence and the Proposed Development's susceptibility to potential major accidents and hazards. The description and assessment should consider the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to a potential accident or disaster and also the Proposed Development's potential to cause an accident or disaster. The assessment should specifically assess significant effects resulting from the risks to human health, cultural heritage or the environment. Any measures that will be employed to prevent and control significant effects should be presented in the ES'.

- 19.4. In respect of the scope of the transport and traffic assessment for the HNRFI, the 2020 Scoping Opinion recommended that the assessment of major accidents and disasters should consider risks from hazardous loads (Scoping Report 2020 paragraph 4.2.1) and the potential impacts of an increase in rail freight movements, both generally and specifically in respect of the operation of the existing level crossing in the centre of Narborough on

the Leicester to Hinckley railway (paragraph 4.2.4). These are all being considered in the EIA. In respect of hazardous loads specifically, TSH envisages that most and potentially all freight passing through the HNRFI would be non-hazardous.

19.5. In its consultation response on TSH’s EIA Scoping Report 2020, Public Health England (PHE) advised that:

Within the ES, PHE would expect to see information about how the applicant would respond to accidents with potential off-site emissions (e.g., flooding or fires, spills, leaks or releases off-site). Assessment of accidents should: identify all potential hazards in relation to construction, operation and decommissioning; include an assessment of the risks posed; and identify risk management measures and contingency actions that will be employed in the event of an accident in order to mitigate off-site effects.

19.6. Measures to manage or avoid the risks identified by PHE during the construction of the HNRFI will be set out in a Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP), which will be submitted in outline with the DCO application with the final version subject to later approval by the relevant planning authorities in accordance with a DCO Requirement (similar to a planning condition).

19.7. In respect of the risks identified by PHE at the operational stage, Chapter 1: *Introduction* of this PEIR explains that the EIA for the HNRFI is following Rochdale Envelope assessment principles. The level of information provided will be sufficient to fulfil the requirement of the EIA Regulations to assess the ‘*expected significant adverse effects of the development on the environment deriving from the vulnerability of the development to risks of major accidents and/or disasters which are relevant to the project concerned*’ (EIA Regulations 2017, Schedule 4, Paragraph 8).

APPROACH AND CONSIDERATION OF VULNERABILITY

19.8. When considering the likely vulnerability of a development to major accidents or disasters there are three key criteria, derived from best practice and guidance set out in *Major Accidents and Disasters in EIA: A Primer*, published by the Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment (IEMA, September 2020) to be considered, as set out in table 19.1.

Table 19.1: Consideration of vulnerability of the Proposed Development to major accidents and / or disasters

Criteria	The Applicant’s preliminary response
1) Is the development a source of hazard that could result in a major accident and/or disaster?	The Proposed Development is not a direct source of hazard over and above those standard construction and operational activities that are described in Chapter 3: <i>Project description</i> of this PEIR and which would be subject to relevant statutory and regulatory controls and

Criteria	The Applicant’s preliminary response
	<p>additional mitigation and safeguards enforced through the DCO.</p> <p>In common with other SRFIs it is anticipated that the HNRFI will cater for occupiers who will handle non-hazardous products and materials. In the event that an individual occupier wished to handle hazardous substances in quantities that would render them Controlled Substances as identified in the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Regulations 2015 it would be the occupier’s responsibility to secure hazardous Substances Consent under the Planning (Hazardous Substances) Act 1990.</p> <p>The Health and Safety Executive (HSE) confirmed in response to the 2020 scoping exercise (HSE letter, 25 November 2020, in appendix 2 of the 2020 Scoping Opinion) that it had no comments on electrical safety in the proposed HNRFI. Photovoltaic installations and the proposed energy centre would operate in accordance relevant electrical safety regulations.</p>
<p>2) Does the development interact with any external sources of hazard?</p>	<p>The HSE confirmed that there are no major accident sites and no major accident hazard pipelines within the draft Order Limits (HSE letter, 25 November 2020, in appendix 2 of the 2020 Scoping Opinion). There are no licenced explosives sites in the vicinity.</p> <p>No other external sources of hazard have been identified that would interact with the Proposed Development or give rise to vulnerability.</p> <p>Freight carried by in the UK has a better safety record than freight carried by road. By enabling a transfer of freight from road to rail the HNRFI should thus help to reduce road accidents.</p>
<p>3) If an external man-made or natural hazard occurred, would the presence of the development increase the risk of significant environmental effect(s) to an environmental receptor</p>	<p>TSH has not identified any pathways by which the Proposed Development would increase the risk of significant environmental effects from external natural or man-made hazards.</p> <p>Where external hazards require an emergency response, the improved road connectivity afforded by the proposed</p>

Criteria	The Applicant’s preliminary response
occurring?	M69 J2 upgrade and the A47 link road would facilitate access to the scene of the event.

- 19.9. Having considered these criteria, the next stage involves determining whether, for those developments where a risk might be identified, existing design measures or legal requirements, codes and / or standards would adequately control the potential major accident and / or disaster, or whether it will be adequately covered by another assessment or topic.
- 19.10. The vulnerability of the HNRFI to major accidents and disasters from an environmental perspective will be taken into account in the assessment of a range of topics reported in the Environmental Statement that will accompany TSH’s DCO application, including socio-economics, human health, transport (rail and road) and traffic, water resources and flood risk and greenhouse gases and climate change.
- 19.11. In most cases, existing approaches to managing risk already exist and can be used to understand the residual level of risk. The UK already has a structured framework of risk management legislation in place – notably, for example, for rail operations and flood risk - and it is not deemed appropriate to duplicate any risk quantification and management that will be undertaken in any event as part of the wider consideration of the DCO application, or from any future construction and operational procedures that the HNRFI would be subject to.
- 19.12. In appraising the vulnerability of the Proposed Development to major accidents and disasters, it is considered that the wide range of established safety and security legislation applicable to the construction and operation of a SRFI is generally sufficient to manage the risks identified.
- 19.13. During the pre-application stage TSH will continue to consult with local police, fire, ambulance and health services and Network Rail. The design of the HNRFI takes into account considerations including access for the emergency and security services.

SUMMARY

- 19.14. The DCO application will be accompanied by the following documents that explain provisions to avoid or reduce vulnerability to accidents and disasters:
 - Construction Method Statement (CMS);
 - Outline Construction Environmental Management Plan (CEMP);
 - Outline Lighting Strategy (LS);
 - Outline Construction Traffic Management Plan (CTMP);
 - Other Consents and Licences report.

- 19.15. In addition, the DCO application will be accompanied by a Rail Operations Report that will include assessment of potential hazards to rail operations and their avoidance or mitigation. This will include consideration for the level crossing in central Narborough.
- 19.16. This integrated approach to control and management ensures that vulnerability to major accidents and/or disasters is being taken into account in the design and environmental assessment of the Proposed Development and the risks identified will be reduced to as low as reasonably practicable.